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NOTE AND COMMENT
DEEDS DELIVERED CONDITIONALLY TO THE GRANT-.--Generally courts have
shown a commendable disposition to get away from the formalism, which in
the past played such a large part in determination of questions of delivery.
While the actual tradition of the instrument to the grantee or to someone
on his behalf, on the one hand, or its retention in the hands of the maker,
on the other, is still very important evidentially, such facts are not by any
means controlling. Thus it is entirely possible for a deed to be delivered
though it never has been out of the grantor's hands; likewise a deed may
be undelivered though in the hands of the grantee by the voluntary act of
the grantor. See the discussion by Professor Tiffany ir I7 MCHc. L. Rv. 1o4,
et seq., citing many cases. This result has come from the growing appreciation by the courts that delivery after all is simply the manifestation of the
grantor's intent that, as to him, the instrument is a completed legal act.
This intent is normally shown by a handing over of the deed to the grantee
or to someone- for him, but there are other ways of showing such intent.
A deed in the hands of the grantor prima fade has been delivered; if in the
hands of the grantor, prima facie, it has not been delivered.
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happening of an event. In Wilson v. Powers, T31 Mass. 539,
an action on a
promissory note it was held permissible to show that thein note
had been
handed to the payee to take effect only on the performance of a
condition.
Devens, J., said: "The manual delivery of an instrument may always
be
proved to have been on a condition which has not been fulfilled in
order to
avoid its effect." In truth it seems that with reference to instruments
other
than deeds of conveyance such facts may be proved. See Pyrn v. Campbell,
6 E. & B. 370; 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCS, § 241o.

There seems to be here a

striking instance of a survival of a formalistic* doctrine (explained
by the
relation between delivery of deeds of conveyance and primitive modes
of
conveyance) regarding which English courts have shown a more enlightened
view than have courts on this side. Indeed this is characteristic
of the
attitudes of the courts in the two countries regarding the law of Real
Property, generally.
Reference should be made to Lee v. Richmond, 9o Iowa 696, where
the
rule of Whyddon's Case was not applied.
R. W. A.
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAuLT.-In Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,
2ox N. Y.
271, appeared, as a basis for the decision, the statement that "When
our
Constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that no man who
was
without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages for
injuries
sustained by another. That is still the law." Mr. Justice McKenna
has recently voiced the same idea. In his dissenting opinion in Arizona
Copper
Co. v. Hammer, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, he contends that the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Arizona is unconstitutional, because, "It seems to
me to be
of the very foundation of right-of the essence of liberty as it is of moralsto be free from liability if one is free from fault." Even the majority
of the
court seemed inclined to justify their decision, that the Act was constitutional,
by the argument that, as the liability under it would be known in
advance,
employers could protect themselves by "reducing wages and increasing
the
se!ling price of the product, in order to allow for the statutory liability."
The fallacy of this proposition, as a principle of the Common Law,
has
been several times pointed out. One type of case, however, in which
liability without fault not only exists, but is constantly being enlarged,
seems to
have been ignored. By the Common Law there is imposed upon sellers
of
goods, in certain instances, a liability of which they are not notified
and
which has no relation whatever to fault or free will on their part.
These are the cases in which sellers of goods are held to be' absolute
insurers of the harmlessness thereof. In Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93
Kan. 334,
for instance, the plaintiff had been poisoned by some deleterious substance
in
a pie which he had bought from a retail dealer. There was no vrivity
of
contract with the defendant, but the latter, as a manufacturer, had made
the
pie and sold it to the intermediate dealer. The action for damages
was in
tort. There was absolutely no evidence of fault on the defendant's
part
even offered, beyond the facts stated. Nevertheless, the court held that
the
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who sell water for household purposes. The defendant was held liable, on
an implied warranty of wholesomeness, regardless of any negligence on its
part, because the plaintiff had contracted typhoid fever from the water which
its municipal waterworks had furnished.
The reason given for these holdings bases them squarely, not on zny real
assumption of liability, but on a liability imposed by law as a matter of public
policy. In Jackson v. Watson & Sons, [I9o91 2 K. B. i03, it was said by
Vaughn Williams, L. J., that the cause of action, whether in form of tort or
of contract arose out of a duty following the relation of the parties.
Should Mr. Justice McKenna ever desire to withdraw from his position
in the Arizona Copper Co. case, without the appearance of having reversed
himself, he might say boldly, on the precedent of Parks v. Yost Pie Co.,
"Practically, an employer must know his employment is safe. or take the
consequences." Or he might say, more euphemistically but none the less
legitimately, "In every contract of employment there is, if public policy so
requires, an implied warranty that the work is safe."
J. B. W.
CONTRACTS FOR TH1 BSNEFIT OF A THIRD PERSON IN MICHIGAN.-In the
recent case of Preston v. Preston the supreme court of Michigan had occasion
to consider the question as to whether or not one for whose benefit a contract
is made has any enforcible rights. The suit was one 'in Chancery, the donee
plaintiff was an invalid, and every consideration of justice and equity demanded that she be given relief. The court had, however, to face the fact
that in recent cases it had indicated its opinion to be that the third party
beneficiary has no rights. In Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, (igio) 163 Mich.
449, 456 the court speaking through the late Justice Ostrander had said, "The
general rule in this state is regarded as settled. I see no reason for saying
that it is not the same in proceedings at law and in equity." Again in In re
Bush's Estate. (oi7) io9 Mich. 102, x96. Justice Kuhn, the writer of the
opinion in the principal case, had said, "No serious claim is made that a
promise made by one person to another for the benefit of a third-a stranger
to the consideration-will support an action by the latter according to the
law of this state." And at page x9, "But the situation before us is not
merely a question of ajplying the remedy to the rights of the parties, but
under the law as it existed at the time this claim was filed, the claimant had
no rights arising out of the transaction against the defending estate."
The court in its first opinion in the case, reported at 205 Mich. 646, took
the position that the rule -as above announced had been so far changed by
Sec. io, Chap. 12, Act No. 314, Pub. Acts 1915 (3 MICH. Corn'. LAWS 1915,

§ 12361) as to enable the donee beneficiary to maintain a suit in equity on
the promise made for her benefit. That this view is untenable was shown in
a note in a recent number of this review (18 MICH. L. Rzv. s8) wherein the
hope was expressed that a more satisfactory basis might be found for the
holding. On rehearing, in an opinion recently filed but not yet reported, the
court receded from the position originally taken and now supports its judgment on entirely different grounds. From a reconsideration of the evidence
in the case it now finds as a fact that the promise was made directly to the
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plaintiff, although the consideration was furnished by plaintiff's mother who,
according to the original finding, was the sole promisee. As a result of this
interpretation of the evidence the court concludes that the plaintiff is a privy
to the contract and as such entitled to maintain the suit on the ground that
this is an exception to the rule denying a right of action to one for whose
ben-Jit a contract is made. (i75 N. W. 266.)
It is quite obvious that the court in its conclusion has confused two
questions which are essentially different. If the plaintiff was a party to the
contract-a promisee--,as the court finds, then the case is not one involving
a contract for the benefit of a third person at all in the sense in which that
phrase is commonly employed, and it simply makes confusion worse confounded to say that it is an exception to the general rule. There is under
these circumstances no want of privity in the plaintiff-the usual ground for
denying relief in third party cases-and the only question involved is whether
or not a party to a contract may enforce a promise made to him, the consideration for which was furnished by another. This question has always
been answered in the affirmative in Michigan, both at law and in equity,
and it has never been asserted that this holding at all conflicts with the rule
denying the right of a third party beneficiary. Monaghan y. Agricultural
Fire Ins. Co., 53 Mich. 238; Clark v. Clark, 134 Mich. 6o2 (semble) ; Palmer
v. Bray, 136 Mich. 85. This is in accord with the generally prevailing rule in
this country. Van Eman v. Stanchfield, xo Minn. 255; Rector v. Teed, 120
N. Y. 583; Palmer Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. i89; Williamson v.
Yager, oi Ky. 282. Contra: Dunlop v. Selfridge, (1915] A. C. 847.
In view of the evident uncertainty in regard to the third party's rights it
may be worth while to try to determine just what has been decided by the
court. Where the action was one at law for breach of promise, the uniform
holding has been that the third party has no enforcible rights, and this is
true as well in the case of a sole or donee beneficiary as in the case of a
creditor beneficiary. Pipp v. Reynolds, 2o Mich.-88; Turner v. McCarty, 22
Mich. 264; Halsted v. Francis, 31 Mich. 112, Hicks v. McGarry, 38 Mich.
667; Hidden v. Chappel, 48 Mich. 527; Edwards v. Clement, 8r Mich. 5r3;
Wheeler v. Stewart, 94 Mich. 445; Linneman v. M'oross, 98 Mich. 178; Signs
v. Bush Estate, z99 Mich. 192. But where the defendant has received specific
funds to be delivered to the third party, it is held the latter may enforce the
obligation in general assumpsit. Fay v. Anderson, 48 Mich- 259. It has also
been held that a sole beneficiary to whom the promisee his assigned his
rights under the contract may enforce the claim at law as assignee, and it is
intimated that he may recover substantial damages. Ebel v. Pichl, 134 Mich.
64. Such a result would, however, be difficult to justify in view of the fact
that the ordinary rule would limit the recovery in such a case to nominal
damages. See Burbank v. Gould, is Me. m8; Adams v. Union R. R. Co..
21 R. I. z34. Search has failed to disclose any suit in Chancery brought by
the beneficiary, except that of a mortgagee beneficiary to be mentioned later,
in which a decision of this question was necessary to dispose of the case.
Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, supra. is not an exception to this statement for
the reason that in that case the court apparently found as a fact that the
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promise sued on had not been made. See head note to the case. Assuming
the alleged promise to have been made, it was clearly one which would
only incidentally have benefitted the plaintiff and cannot therefore be said to
have been made for his benefit. The court has, however, frequently expressed the opinion obiter either that relief in equity would be granted to
the beneficiary or that the question is still an open one. See Linneman v.
Moross, 9 Mich. 178; Clare v. Warner, io6 Mich. 695; Palmer.v. Bray, 136
Mich. 85. In Peer v. Kean, 14 Mich. 354, where A contracted with B on a
consideration furnished by the latter to build a ship and on its completion to
convey a one-half interest to B's wife upon payment by her of certain
charges, the court granted specific performance of the promise at the suit
of B, the promisee. Whether the same relief would have been granted at
the suit of the wife was not indicated. The mortgagee beneficiary has always
been granted relief in equity as against the grantee of the mortgaged premises
who assumed the mortgage, but whether on the theory of subrogation or by
reason of a statute (CoMP. L. 1915 § i268o) the court has not always definitely indicated. Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 353; Miller v. Thompson,
34 Mich. 9; Corning v. Burton, 1o2 Mich. 86.
It is quite clear that the third party, at any rate where he is a sole or
donee beneficiary, ought to be given relief. The cases show that parents as
well as others frequently make provision in this way for those dependent
upon their bounty. To deny the latter a remedy is to enrich the unscrupulous
at the expense of the needy. While the rule of stare decis probably precludes
the giving of relief in an action at law, the question is apparently still an
open one in equity, and relief in the nature of specific perfrnrmance would
not seem t be inconsistent with equitable principles. Such a holding would
make it unnecessary to strain the facts to do jdstice in a particular case.
Perhaps legislative action on the matter would not be untimely. G. C. G.
PUBLIC UTILITIZS-FRANCHISz RATmS AS Ap scT. BY TnZ WORLD WAR.-

The economic convulsions due to the World War are abundantly reflected
in the relations between the public and their public utilities operating under
franchises fixing rates for service. The enormous rise in cost of labor and
materials has, in many cases, so reduced the net income of such utilities as
to make it a negative quantity at existing franchise rates. The utilities are
crying to be saved from bankruptcy, but the unfortunate suspicion bred by
past dealings of many such companies has made the public skeptical, and
perhaps in many cases entirely unreasonable. In some cases plain selfishness may explain the attitude on both sides. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently held that a contract is still a contract, notwithstanding the critical conditions caused by the war. Columbus Ry. P. & L.
Co. v. Columbus, (U. S. i919) 39 Sup. Ct. 349, (see 17 MIcE. L. Rzv. 689),
followed in Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (ig9g) 26o Fed. 322. Though the
German steamship company may have been justified in turning back and failing to carry out its contract to deliver at Plymouth and Cherbourg gold
shipped on the Kronprinzessin Cecilie, since the imminent danger of capture
by a belligerent which would have ended possibility of performance excused
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performance entirely, Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 13, yet this does not
affect the general principle "that if a party charge himself with an obligation
possible to be performed he must abde by it. unless performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties will not excuse performance." lb. The very essence of a contract is
that the contractor takes the risk within the limits of his undertaking. Day
v. U. S., 245 U. S. i59; North Hempstead v. Pub. Serv. Corp., 176 N. Y. S.
621. The courts cannot relieve nor make new contracts for the parties.
Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (1019) 256 Fed. 928.
In the Columbus case the terms of the franchise were clear, the fare to
be charged was explicitly stated, there was no room for interpretation.
Though the War Labor Board had granted a fifty per cent increase in wages
to the employees of the company, yet this was not an intervention by the
government as in Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1918] A.
C. 119. A rise in the cost of labor is one of the risks. Indeed it is not
shown that the franchise would be unprofitable for the whole 25 years period.
Would it make a difference if it were shown? The company, then, could
not throw up its franchise and ask the aid of a court of equity to relieve it
from its hard bargain. The city, acting under state authority, had made the
contract and was bound by it. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 2o6
U. S. 496. Can it be supposed that the company would have revised the
bargain in favor of the city if the advantages had been reversed? The company must be held equally bound though temporarily at least, the operation
of the lines must result in a loss. The remedy, if any be needed, addresses
itself to the duly constituted authorities. See also Moorhead v. Union L. H.
& P. Co.,'(x918) 255 Fed. 92o; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (i919)

258 Fed. 485.
During 1919 many rate disputes growing out of this high operating cost
have come to the couxts of last resort. Some may be noted which involve
contracts between the utility and the municipality which granted the franchise to operate. In 17 Mxcn. L. Rgv. 429 attention was called to the unpleasant surprise the public was having in discovering that franchise rates
which had been upheld as fixed and binding against the public when in
favor of the utilities, were no longer fixed, but subject to revision upward now that they were unprofitable and ruinous to the utilities. The
utilities have cried for relief to the public utilities commissions, the people's
own boards, and their cry is being heard, for experience shows that such
commissions are much more likely than the local authorities to grant at
least emergency relief. State v. Lewis, (Ind., xg18) 12o N. E. x2g; Otlumwa
Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa. (Ia..,iQi9) 173 N. W. 270.
That a franchise between a municipality acting within its powers and
a utility corporation is a binding contract is still undoubted, law, North
Hempsteaa v. Pub. Serv. Corp. 176 N. Y. S. 621; Cleveland v. Cleveland City
Ry. Co., 194 0. S. 517; Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio,
1918) i2o N. E. 831; Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (xgig) 256 Fed.
929; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (1gg) 258 Fed. 485, but it is be-
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coming much clearer how often the city in assuming to fix rates has acted
without proper legislative authorization, Otturnwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Otiurnwa, supra; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Cons., (Ga., i9i9)
98 S. E. 696; KalamazoQ v. Circuit Judge, (1918) 200 Mich. 146; San Airtonjo Public Serv. Co. v. San Antonio, (1919) 257 Fed. 467; Atlanta v.
Atlanta Gaslight Co., (Ga. igig) zoo S. E. 439; Winchester v. Winchester
Waterworks Co., (U. S. Adv. Ops., Jan. 5, i92O), and that such rates when
lawfully fixed are always subject to the police power of the state, which
cannot be surrendered, Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (gig) 176 N. Y. S. 147;
St. Louis v. Pub. Serv.. Co., (Mo., i918) 2o7 S. W. 799; Atlantic Coast
Electric Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coi., (N. J., 1918) io4 At. 218; Interurban Ry. Ca. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio. ioi8) 12o N. E. 831; Salt Lake
Ry.
City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, 1918) 173 Pac. 556; Georgia in
& Power Co. v. Railroad Corn., (Ga., i9i9) 98 S.. E. 696, and hence that
the conall cases except where the people have restrained the legislature in

stitution the rates fixed in the franchise, and which are binding as against
the city, may be raised by the legislature, InterurbanRy. Co. v. Puo. Utilities
Coin., supra, or by a public commission to which the legislature has clearly
committed such-.power. Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Cor., (i919) 176 N. Y. S.
than
147; State v. Lewis. (Ind., ioi8) i2o N. E. iso. This is nothing more
to say that when the state through one of its minor subdivisions has made
a binding contract it has the power, with or without the consent of such
subdivision, to release the other party to the contract, even though it may
be admitted the other party would not release the state if the conditions
were reversed. This it does, not out of generosity, but because it regards
it as good public policy to have its public utilities in good financial condition so as to insure good service. Just why the locality" more immediately
affected does not usually take this view of it is a study in psychology or
to
sociology rather than in law. Most of the cases show the cities trying
relief.
granting
or
utility,
the
of
cry
the
hearing
from
commissions
prevent the
Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Co., supra; Atlantic Coast Electric Railway Co. v. Pub.
Utility Co., (N. J., 1918) io4 AtI. 218; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co.. (Utah. m0x8) 173 Pac. .56; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad
Corn., (Ga., i919) 98 S. E. 696.
Such wad the case of InternationalRy. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (ig9g) z26
of
N. Y. 474, which well illustrates how since 1917 the shoe pinches the footoff,
it
kick
to
struggling
is
on
it
putting
after
city
the
and
wearer,
other
the
while the utility after trying to keep out of it is now eager to get in. In 1916
the city of Buffalo. claiming that the permitted fare was too high, petitioned
two
the Public Service Commission to fix a just and reasonable rate. For
longer
no
was
it
claiming
company,
the
years the petition lay dormant. Then
a question of lower rates, but a choice between higher rates and bankruptcy,
The
joined the now unwilling city in its forgotten prayer for a revision.
long
and
unwelcome
the
accept
to
refused
city,
Commission, siding with the
hear
delayed answer, but the Court of Appeals found the Commission must
court
the
244,
Y.
N.
223
Coin.,
Serv.
the case. In Matter of Quinby v. Public

NOTE AND COMMENT
had held that in the absence of clear and definite language it would not be
assumed that the legislature had authorized the commission to annul conditions imposed by local authorities, but the conditions in the Buffalo franchise necessarily implied an agreement for revisions. The New York con.
stitution, like that of many other states, e. g., Missouri, St. Louis v. Pub.
Serv. CoM., 207 S. W. 799; and Utah, Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Traction Co., 173 Pac. 556, forbids the construction or operation of a street railroad without the consent of the local authorities first obtained. This means
the consent may be conditioned on charging a named rate of fare, but it does
not remove beyond the control of the legislature in the exercise of its police
power a revision of the rate so agreed upon. People ex rel. Glen Falls v.
Pub. Serv. Cor., 225 N. Y. 216. Whether the municipality might revoke its
consent if the legislature should raise the rate was left open in that case, and
again in the recent case of InternationalRy. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 226 N.
Y. 474, but apparently the New York Legislature has given to the Commission all the power it had over rates not already fixed by statute, NiagaraFalls
v. Pub. Ser. Com.. 177 N. Y. S. 861 (Sept:. i10x). or by legislative sanction
equivalent to a statute, Quinby v. Pub. Ser,. Com., 223 N. Y. 244; Koehn v.
Pub. Serv. Corn., x76 N. Y. S. 147. In those cases even though the statutory
rate might be confiscatory the Commission is not endowed with power to
so adjudge. They are outside its jurisdictioni. People ex rel. Gas Co. of
Albany v. Pub. Seer. Com., 224 N. Y. 156. Compare Maine cases appearing
since this note was written: In re Guilford Water Co's. Rates, io8 Atl. 446;
In re Searsport Water Co., Ibid. 452; In re Island Falls Water Co., Ibid. 459.
There is no longer any doubt that in general as against the municipality
reasonable rates fixed by contract between the municipality and the utility
are liable to be superceded by rates fixed by the legislature in the exercise
of its police power, or by a commission under legislative authority clearly
conferred. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S.
372 (1919). From this it often results that franchise rates cannot be changed
as against the utility, because it would amount to impairingthe obligation of a
contract, but they may be changed by the legislature as against the municipality because the municipality is a subordinate division of the stAte and is
always subject to the legislative power, except as restrained by the constitution. Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio, 9I18) 12o N. E.
831; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, sgi8) 173 Pac.
556; Englewovd v. Denver & So. Platt Ry. Co.. 248 U. S. 294 (iig),
followed
in Black v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., (La., xgig) 82 So. 81, refusing
remedy in such a case to a citizen taxpayer; State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918) 120
N. E. i29. But certainly if the statutes leave with the municipalities the
power to fix rates they may enter into mutually binding contracts with refer.
ence thereto, and a recent case holds that-when such a contract is once entered
into the city as well as the company is protected against a change even by the
legislature by reason of the Federal Constitutional prohibition against any
state passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract. Cincinnati v.
Pub. Utility Com. (Ohio, i9x8) 121 N. E. 688. As to the municipality this
may be doubted, and Jones, J., in dissenting points out that municipalities
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are political subdivisions of the state, and mere agents subject to the power
of the state to change its regulations. It would seem that only a constitutional provision could restrain the legislature. State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918)
12o N. E. 129; Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co.,
(1919) 255 Fed. 378, 408. In such case it gets its power, not from the
legislature, but from the people and the municipality is then, of course, beyond
the reach of the legislature. InterurbanRy. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio,
i918) 120 N. R. 831.
What utilities will do that find themselves headed for bankruptcy and
denied increase over franchise rates does not fully appear. They may try
coercion by refusal to operate, as in Toledo and some other places, but so
far as the courts are concerned it seems clear they cannot grant relief, even
by establishing a receivership. The receiver must operate under the contract. Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co., supra.
North American Construction Co. v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., (1919) 256
Fed. r07, in which the court suggests that if it is a question of a raise in rates
or of a poorer service the class of service must yield rather than the rates.
But what right can there be to yield either? It may be bad public policy to
insist on such hard bargains against public utilities, but.public policy addresses
itself to the legislatures, not to the courts. Muescatine Light Co. v. Muscatine,
(ioig) 256 Fed. 929, Ottumwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa, (Ia., 1919) I73
N. W. 27o. See also Pub. Utilities Com. v. Rhode Island Co., (R. I., 1919)
26o Fed. 322.
bo7 AtI. "87r, io8 Atl. 66, Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (i91g)

Both the utilities and the public should learn that their interests are largely
mutual, and that it may be neither just nor safe to insist on tak;ng all the
advantages of a hard bargain. No one can tell when conditions may reverse
. C. G.
advantages.

